An Insight into Taliban's Activities in Pakistan

     

We have already seen in my article “Muslim Millat and Pakistan’s Role in Ensuing Decade” that political, economic and military weakness of Muslim World is the biggest hurdle in their way to establish true and complete Islamic systems in their respective countries. The stated objective of Taliban is to enforce Islamic systems in Pakistan but practically their activities are weakening military, economic and political institutions in Pakistan and weakening of these institutions  reduces further Pakistan’s capacity to enforce Islamic systems in the country. The solution of the problem lies in unity of whole Muslim ‘Millat’ in the form of Political and Economic Muslim Union on the pattern of EU. But Taliban’s activities in Pakistan are quite inimical to this objective of Political and Economic Muslim Union because they are weakening political, economic and military institutions in Pakistan and because the Millat Unity cannot be achieved without strong institutions. Taliban’s activities are suicidal attempt to the cause of enforcement of Islamic systems in Pakistan.

Taliban’s activities in Pakistan have put Pakistani governments under pressure politically and economically. As a result, Pakistani governments become more vulnerable to accept political and economic dictations of the west. Acceptance of such dictations take Pakistan further away from the goal of islamization. The more Taliban attack and destroy military installations and economic vanguards in Pakistan, the more Pakistan gets away from the goal of establishment of Islamic systems.

The above stated situation becomes even more grim when we see that many operations conducted by some Taliban in Pakistan are financed by non-Muslim enemy states of Pakistan. Such a unholy alliance between some Taliban and India leads us to believe that actually such Taliban are serving India’s interests. Taliban should not think that a Pakistan weakened to death (Allah forbid) by Taliban activities would be presented to Taliban by their Indian collaborators. If such an exigency arises (we know such exigency is next to impossible and can only be seen in the wildest imagination), India would be the first country to run over Pakistan to keep Taliban away. In other words, the wholesome impact of Taliban’s attacks in Pakistan may be no more than weakening political, military and economic institutions, an exigency which reduces further Pakistan’s capability to establish Islamic systems.

Taliban’s standpoint in another way is becoming a hurdle in the way of a strong  Pakistan. They insist that Pakistani forces should withdraw from tribal areas. Such a demand would mean separating tribal areas from Pakistan for all practical purposes; an eventuality which would reduce Pakistan’s political and economic strength. Such a demand from Taliban is neither justifiable  nor supporting to their professed cause of Islamization in Pakistan. Even if Taliban are able to establish a true and complete Islamic system in tribal areas, separation of tribal areas from Pakistan would mean the accruing impact of Islamic system in tribal areas would be locked into the tribal areas and would not be allowed to reach to rest of Pakistan. Such an eventuality definitely does not match the professed objectives of Taliban.

Now the question arises if Taliban’s present strategy to attack and weaken Pakistan’s political, military and economic institutions is inimical to their professed cause of establishment of Islamic systems in Pakistan, what option are they left with to establish Islamic systems in Pakistan?

It may be appreciated that establishment of Islamic system in Pakistan is not only professed ideology of Taliban but also constitutional responsibility of government of Pakistan. Negotiations may be initiated between Pakistan and Taliban to establish such Islamic systems which may be established keeping within Pakistan’s present capability; such Islamic systems which are beyond Pakistan’s capability to enforce at present may be pended and left to be enforced at later stages. Negotiations between Pakistan and Taliban on these lines may become Pakistan’s policy with or without military operation against Taliban.

Pakistan is standing at a critical juncture of its history; it demands special care to be taken to have a balance between accommodating fair demands and resisting unfair demands put forth by Taliban.

We may conclude that both Taliban and Pakistan have two options before them. The first option is they may either choose to continue with gun battles which would not serve the stated purposes of either side; Islamic systems would not be established in Pakistan, and Pakistan’s political, military and economic powers would be eroded. The second option is to negotiate with genuine Taliban to establish whatever Islamic systems may be possibly enforced at present  keeping within Pakistan’s present capability. Bogus Taliban which are playing in the foreign hands, must be straight away flushed away from Pakistan.  The second option would bring peace and power to both parties; the first option would bring irreparable losses to both parties. The second option may be adopted even after military option.