Weakening of Institutions vs Reforming of Institutions

      

Present political scenario in Pakistan and many other Muslim countries is dominated with the discussions and practical struggles as to how existing state institutions in respective Muslim countries may be replaced with such just and effective institutions which should be  more responding to religious and social needs of the people.  The driving forces behind this scenario are two types. The first are those who believe in armed struggle; these militant forces believe in weakening of existing state institutions to such an extent that respective state would become dysfunctional and resultantly be taken over by the militants. The second are those who are non-militant forces and their stated objective is just to reform existing institutions. 

It may be appreciated that weakening an institution is a phenomenon when the institution is prevented from or fails in performing its assigned functions in just and effective manner; resultantly such institution is deprived of public backing. Whereas in the process of institutional reformation, the institution is not prevented from performing its assigned functions; rather, in the process, institutional structure is either modified or is erected altogether on new foundations. It may also be appreciated that reformation of state institutions can be done only by the state itself whereas weakening of state institutions may be done by non-state actors as well. As stated above, militant forces’ objective is to replace existing state institutions and for the purpose they strive to weaken the existing institutions, it is obvious they cannot succeed in their objective unless they acquire state power to reform the existing institutions. In other words, merely weakening of institutions would be meaningless and destructive only, if such weakening of institutions cannot be followed with constructive approach of reforming of institutions and reforming of institutions is not possible without state powers.

It seems that both militant and non-militant forces are unable to draw a clear distinction between the policy of weakening of state institutions and reforming of state institutions. We can see that militant forces often adopt policy of weakening of state institutions in the name of reforming of state institutions. The glaring example are Taliban who conduct destructive policy of weakening of state institutions in Pakistan in the name of reforming of state institutions. As mentioned earlier, because policy of weakening of state institutions is meaningless, if policy of reforming of institutions does not follow, and because state power is required to conduct reforming of state institutions, it is obvious Taliban’s policy of weakening of state institutions in Pakistan is meaningless because Taliban would never be able to take over State of Pakistan and assume state powers in Pakistan. The militants’ policy of weakening of state institutions may be fruitful in countries like Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya- the countries where militants may assume state powers- where policy of weakening of institutions may be followed with policy of reforming of institutions through assuming state powers. Similarly many non-militant forces tend to adopt policy of weakening of state institutions in the name of reforming of state institutions. An example of this phenomenon is Qadri’s campaign we are currently witnessing in Pakistan. Despite all the noble objectives stated by Maulana Qadri, it is an obvious fact he cannot takeover State of Pakistan, which is an essential condition to conduct policy of reforming of state institutions. Any attempt to prevent state institutions from performing their assigned functions would be weakening of state institutions, and policy of weakening of state institutions is meaningless and destructive only, if it cannot be followed with policy of reforming of state institutions; as state power is essential to adopt policy of reforming of state institutions, and Qadri is unlikely to grab state powers in Pakistan, Maulana Qadri’s attempts may only be seen as policy of meaningless weakening of state institutions which would be destructive in nature.

From the foregoing, it should not be adduced that non-state actors may not play any role in reforming of state institutions. Reforming of state institutions is the job of state authorities but non-state actors may give their inputs and build up public pressures to make the state authorities reform the state institutions according to peoples’ aspirations and social, political and economic needs.

An Insight into Taliban's Activities in Pakistan

     

We have already seen in my article “Muslim Millat and Pakistan’s Role in Ensuing Decade” that political, economic and military weakness of Muslim World is the biggest hurdle in their way to establish true and complete Islamic systems in their respective countries. The stated objective of Taliban is to enforce Islamic systems in Pakistan but practically their activities are weakening military, economic and political institutions in Pakistan and weakening of these institutions  reduces further Pakistan’s capacity to enforce Islamic systems in the country. The solution of the problem lies in unity of whole Muslim ‘Millat’ in the form of Political and Economic Muslim Union on the pattern of EU. But Taliban’s activities in Pakistan are quite inimical to this objective of Political and Economic Muslim Union because they are weakening political, economic and military institutions in Pakistan and because the Millat Unity cannot be achieved without strong institutions. Taliban’s activities are suicidal attempt to the cause of enforcement of Islamic systems in Pakistan.

Taliban’s activities in Pakistan have put Pakistani governments under pressure politically and economically. As a result, Pakistani governments become more vulnerable to accept political and economic dictations of the west. Acceptance of such dictations take Pakistan further away from the goal of islamization. The more Taliban attack and destroy military installations and economic vanguards in Pakistan, the more Pakistan gets away from the goal of establishment of Islamic systems.

The above stated situation becomes even more grim when we see that many operations conducted by some Taliban in Pakistan are financed by non-Muslim enemy states of Pakistan. Such a unholy alliance between some Taliban and India leads us to believe that actually such Taliban are serving India’s interests. Taliban should not think that a Pakistan weakened to death (Allah forbid) by Taliban activities would be presented to Taliban by their Indian collaborators. If such an exigency arises (we know such exigency is next to impossible and can only be seen in the wildest imagination), India would be the first country to run over Pakistan to keep Taliban away. In other words, the wholesome impact of Taliban’s attacks in Pakistan may be no more than weakening political, military and economic institutions, an exigency which reduces further Pakistan’s capability to establish Islamic systems.

Taliban’s standpoint in another way is becoming a hurdle in the way of a strong  Pakistan. They insist that Pakistani forces should withdraw from tribal areas. Such a demand would mean separating tribal areas from Pakistan for all practical purposes; an eventuality which would reduce Pakistan’s political and economic strength. Such a demand from Taliban is neither justifiable  nor supporting to their professed cause of Islamization in Pakistan. Even if Taliban are able to establish a true and complete Islamic system in tribal areas, separation of tribal areas from Pakistan would mean the accruing impact of Islamic system in tribal areas would be locked into the tribal areas and would not be allowed to reach to rest of Pakistan. Such an eventuality definitely does not match the professed objectives of Taliban.

Now the question arises if Taliban’s present strategy to attack and weaken Pakistan’s political, military and economic institutions is inimical to their professed cause of establishment of Islamic systems in Pakistan, what option are they left with to establish Islamic systems in Pakistan?

It may be appreciated that establishment of Islamic system in Pakistan is not only professed ideology of Taliban but also constitutional responsibility of government of Pakistan. Negotiations may be initiated between Pakistan and Taliban to establish such Islamic systems which may be established keeping within Pakistan’s present capability; such Islamic systems which are beyond Pakistan’s capability to enforce at present may be pended and left to be enforced at later stages. Negotiations between Pakistan and Taliban on these lines may become Pakistan’s policy with or without military operation against Taliban.

Pakistan is standing at a critical juncture of its history; it demands special care to be taken to have a balance between accommodating fair demands and resisting unfair demands put forth by Taliban.

We may conclude that both Taliban and Pakistan have two options before them. The first option is they may either choose to continue with gun battles which would not serve the stated purposes of either side; Islamic systems would not be established in Pakistan, and Pakistan’s political, military and economic powers would be eroded. The second option is to negotiate with genuine Taliban to establish whatever Islamic systems may be possibly enforced at present  keeping within Pakistan’s present capability. Bogus Taliban which are playing in the foreign hands, must be straight away flushed away from Pakistan.  The second option would bring peace and power to both parties; the first option would bring irreparable losses to both parties. The second option may be adopted even after military option.