Pakistan needs a strong government enjoying wide spread people’s support to deal effectively with monstrous internal issues like Baluchistan up-rising, Taliban’s militarism, wide spread corruption, economic degeneration, and external issues like Kashmir and re-phrasing of regional and international foreign policy in the backdrop of the USA’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. Qadri’s agenda may entangle Pak army as a major stake holder of interim set up. Such an interim government, if given life period for two or three years, would be not only unacceptable to the people but also weak enough to deal with many of above stated issues effectively. Rather such an un-popular interim government would be prone to further aggravate many fore- mentioned issues.
Baluchistan up-rising is such a burning issue which is perceived as the most serious threat to the state security. The key to resolve this issue lies in the agreeable conduct of the annoyed Bloch Chiefs. There is no second opinion that these annoyed Bloch leaders are looking towards political parties to heal their wounds. An interim government having army at its back as a major stake-holder would not be trusted and cooperated by the Bloch leaders; as a result Baluchistan issue would be further aggravated.
Taliban militant activities are also seriously challenging Pakistan government’s writ in Pakistan’s areas. Pakistan army has recently amended its Defense Doctrine and added internal threat as a major danger to the state security. It means Pak army would onwards treat Taliban as enemy of the state; this fact would reduce Pak army’s ability to settle Taliban issue through dialogue and puts political government in more advantageous position to settle this issue through dialogue.
Unresolved Baluchistan and Taliban issues would mean an army dominated interim government would be unable to put in place a law and order situation conducive to economic regeneration. That would mean a further degeneration in economic viability during period of interim government.
An interim government is always lesser capable in realm of foreign policy matters (plz see my article 'Afghanistan Diplomacy-impact on South Asia' regarding major current foreign policy issues of Pakistan) which require constant backing of the state government; an interim government, not being representative of people opinion, cannot ensure required constant state backing to the foreign policies adopted by it. As a result, interim government’s capability to launch durable foreign policies is seriously hampered and lesser than that of a regular elected government.
We may conclude that Qadri’s agenda to entangle Pak army into an interim government would serve only the interests of foreign anti-Pakistan forces which want to see Pakistan's internal security issues unresolved and its economic buoyancy greatly undermined by continued precarious law and order situation so that Pakistan and consequently its army might be forced to promote those foreign powers' interests even at the cost of Pakistan's own interests.