Pakistan needs a strong government enjoying wide
spread people’s support to deal effectively with monstrous internal issues like
Baluchistan up-rising, Taliban’s militarism, wide spread corruption, economic
degeneration, and external issues like Kashmir and re-phrasing of regional and
international foreign policy in the backdrop of the USA’s withdrawal from
Afghanistan. Qadri’s agenda may entangle Pak army as a major stake holder of
interim set up. Such an interim government, if given life period for two or three
years, would be not only unacceptable to the people but also weak enough to
deal with many of above stated issues effectively. Rather such an un-popular
interim government would be prone to further aggravate many fore- mentioned
issues.
Baluchistan up-rising is such a burning issue which is
perceived as the most serious threat to the state security. The key to resolve
this issue lies in the agreeable conduct of the annoyed Bloch Chiefs. There is
no second opinion that these annoyed Bloch leaders are looking towards
political parties to heal their wounds. An interim government having army at
its back as a major stake-holder would not be trusted and cooperated by the Bloch
leaders; as a result Baluchistan issue would be further aggravated.
Taliban militant activities are also seriously
challenging Pakistan government’s writ in Pakistan’s areas. Pakistan army has
recently amended its Defense Doctrine and added internal threat as a major
danger to the state security. It means Pak army would onwards treat Taliban as enemy
of the state; this fact would reduce Pak army’s ability to settle Taliban issue through dialogue and puts political government in more advantageous
position to settle this issue through dialogue.
Unresolved Baluchistan and Taliban issues would mean an
army dominated interim government would be unable to put in place a law and
order situation conducive to economic regeneration. That would mean a further
degeneration in economic viability during period of interim government.
An interim government is always lesser capable in
realm of foreign policy matters (plz see my article 'Afghanistan Diplomacy-impact on South Asia' regarding major current foreign policy issues of Pakistan) which require constant backing of the state
government; an interim government, not being representative of people opinion,
cannot ensure required constant state backing to the foreign policies adopted
by it. As a result, interim government’s capability to launch durable foreign
policies is seriously hampered and lesser than that of a regular elected
government.
We may conclude that Qadri’s agenda to entangle Pak
army into an interim government would serve only the interests of foreign anti-Pakistan
forces which want to see Pakistan's internal security issues unresolved and its economic buoyancy greatly undermined by continued precarious law and order situation so that Pakistan and consequently its army might be forced to promote those foreign powers' interests even at the cost of Pakistan's own interests.
