Indo-Western Agenda and Anti-extremism in Pakistan

  

Indo-Western lobbies in Pakistan are consistently criticizing  educational syllabi of common school systems so that educational syllabi may be changed to make them suited to Indo-Western interests. Indo-Western lobbies opine that present educational syllabi are a main cause of present state of extremism in Pakistan.  In other words, the history being taught to students in Pakistan leads to extremism in Pakistan; therefore changes in educational syllabi are required to remove extremism from Pakistan. The absurdity of this idea is more than obvious.

The extremism being witnessed in Pakistan is more of religious nature; this extremism has its roots in religious concepts not in the history. All extremist groups in Pakistan are either religious or racial groups. These extremist groups are busy in eliminating their fellow countrymen belonging to their opponent groups. It is funny to associate such extremist activities with prodigies performed by our heroes in the history. There is no point in alienating our children from our history under the pretension of removal of extremism from our society.

The extremism being mainly associated with religious beliefs has nothing to do with educational syllabi being taught in common schools in Pakistan because these common schools do not impart religious education at all.

However nefarious designs can be clearly seen working behind this move of changing educational syllabi in Pakistan. History always works as source of inspiration for the nation. An envious history, like one having by the Muslims, is not only invaluable legacy but also a great source of inspiration for the Muslims. To alienate Pakistani children from this great source of inspiration is a conspiracy for making Pakistan’s future generations a spineless nation which would have no ideals to rise up in the comity of nations, and which would have no resistance to stand up against injustice and exploitation meted out by other nations. No other type of Pakistani nation would serve Indo-Western interests in a better way than such a spineless Pakistani nation.

The best way to remove extremism from Pakistan is not to alienate Pakistani children from their heroes but to change negative attitude of religious cadres. Extremism is a religious issue and it needs to be tackled through religion.

Most of the religious conflicts prevailing among various Muslim groups are not based on contradictory beliefs; rather they are rooted in different beliefs held by these Muslim groups.  Two views are different views, if any one of the two may be adopted without negating or accepting the other one. Two views are contradictory views, if any one  of the two may NOT be   adopted without negating the other. This point has been elaborated in my article “ Khilafah and Imamah- not contradictory concepts”.  Our students may become able to differentiate between ‘Different’ and ‘Contradictory’ views by going through Quran and other religious scriptures with neutral minds; such a neutral mindsets may be developed, if students are able to read and understand Quran with their own independent mind without being biased due to their respective creeds. For this purpose, Quranic studies must be made compulsory part of educational syllabi of our common school systems so that students may have enough capability to read and understand Quran with neutral minds. 

Structural changes may also be brought about in the way religious education is imparted in Pakistan. Instead of separate chain of ‘madaras’ dedicated for every creed, common ‘madaras’ may be established where students of all creeds may be given religious education of their respective creeds. In such common ‘madaras’, all students should also be exposed to religious views nourished by other creeds as well. In this way religious students would be able to cultivate in themselves more critical and analytical approach which would go a long way in making them much more moderate and tolerant. Such an environment in religious ‘madaras’  would help a lot in mitigating severity of conflicts prevailing among various religious groups.

We may conclude that issue of extremism in Pakistan should not be made an excuse for foreign states to secure their own nefarious designs. We should hit right where the problem lies; extremism in Pakistan is mainly related to religious beliefs, not to history being taught to our children. Extremism in Pakistan has to be dealt with through tackling religious issues and religious thinking.

The USA’s Second Policy Option in Afghanistan (2)

    

In the part (1) of this article titled “The USA’s Second Policy Option in Afghanistan” (1), we have seen that the USA’s first policy option in Afghanistan has failed, and now they may switch over to their second policy option which would have very important implications for the regional countries.

As the basic objective behind the USA’s second policy option is to create bad blood between China and Afghan Taliban, the implications of this policy option would  impact  Afghanistan the most. The first victim of this policy option would be dream of political stability in Afghanistan in near future. More precisely the USA’s second policy option would mean the USA would be ready to let Afghanistan plunge in political turmoil for many years to come, if Afghan Taliban join hands with China to make Afghanistan a part of regional integrated economic block. It may please be appreciated the USA become hostile to terrorist and militant activities, if such activities affect adversely the USA’s interests; if such activities support USA’s policy targets, the USA would like to fan such activities. The examples of Syria, Libya, Iraq and Pakistan prove this basic fact of the USA’s foreign policy. Afghanistan is very crucial for the USA’s regional and ultimately international objectives; Afghanistan may serve as the biggest hurdle in the way of likely economically integrated block consisting China and the regional Islamic countries. This block, once established, would mark the end of dominant regional influence of the USA and ultimately its dominant international influence. In other words, the USA may go to any extent to maintain its regional and international influence, and would not hesitate, for that purpose, to bring China and Afghan Taliban in conflict with each other.

 

The USA may use only a few most radical Afghan groups against China. Once distanced from the mainstream Taliban, such radical Afghan groups would not flinch in harboring terrorists and militants from all over the world; such situation would have serious repercussions not only for China but also for other neighboring countries of Afghanistan, particularly Central Asian States. If mainstream Taliban turn hostile to radical Afghan groups, such radical Afghan groups may also seek strength by joining hands with ISIS; such a eventuality would enhance ISIS’s strength in Afghanistan. That would mean further decrease in mainstream Afghan Taliban’s strength to overthrow Kabul regime. In addition to would-be anti-China radical Taliban, other radical Taliban groups may also join ISIS. Such an eventuality would further ensure continuity of infighting, on the one hand, between Kabul regime and mainstream Afghan Taliban and, on the other hand, between mainstream Taliban and radical Taliban or ISIS Taliban. Such an infighting and militancy in Afghanistan would suit the USA too much. Rather it would be, for the USA, an ideal situation in which all its enemies including Afghan Taliban, radical Taliban (along with militant elements harbored by these radical Taliban), and ISIS Taliban would be fighting against one another; and Afghanistan would have emerged as a biggest hurdle in the way of regional integrated economic block.

Afghanistan marred with infighting would also present very serious implications to Iran. As Afghanistan infighting may lead to emergence of even more powerful ISIS, such stronger ISIS would be a real threat to Iran and Iranian interests in Afghanistan.  

India would be no lesser happy than the USA, if Afghanistan is plunged into bloody civil war. India would be more satisfied with such a situation in Afghanistan viz a viz Kashmir dispute. As already mentioned, Pak-India friendly relations might be one of the objectives of the USA’s second policy option so that Pakistan might be pulled away from China’s economic and political circle. But now that Pakistan has gone too far in developing strategic and economic alliance with China, as is reflected in agreed Pak-China Corridor, the USA, in this changed scenario, would not be interested in getting Kashmir dispute resolved. Already USA was not ready to resolve this dispute in Pakistan’s favor; but now USA would not be interested in resolving this dispute at all. The reason is simple. The unresolved Kashmir dispute would keep India out of integrated economic block likely to be emerged in the region- Pakistan, due to its geography, would not allow India to be integrated without resolution of Kashmir dispute. As a result, India’s and USA’s interests converge in Afghanistan; both would want to see Afghanistan away from the likely regional integrated economic block.

As USA’s and India’s interests are better served through civil war in Afghanistan; Pak-China’s interests can be promoted through Afghanistan which should be a part of likely regional integrated economic block. In other words, Pak-China interests can be protected and promoted only if there is peace in Afghanistan, and if Afghan Taliban are free from infighting and maintain unity of command.

From the foregoing, it may be concluded that Afghanistan marred with infightings is not in favor of China, Pakistan, Iran and other neighboring countries of Afghanistan. Therefore all neighboring countries of Afghanistan, and specially China, Iran and Pakistan should move with unity to ensure peace in Afghanistan and to make Taliban- Kabul Regime talks a success. All these neighboring countries should also be clearer that India’s role in Afghanistan without resolution of Kashmir dispute would be more matching to the USA’s interests than to the neighboring countries’ interests.

 

 

 

 

 

 

The USA’s Second Policy Option in Afghanistan (1)

  

We have already seen in my article ‘Imperatives of Pakistan's Foreign Policy  that the major consideration of USA is to prevent the probability of China emerging as economic and political super power and Central Asian Muslim countries including Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan all joining Chinese block. In the backdrop of this consideration, the USA may have two opposite choices regarding Afghan situation. The first choice of USA may be to oppose establishment of Islamic state in Afghanistan. The pre-condition of such a choice would be installation of a USA friendly government in Afghanistan so that USA’s regional interests may be protected. Such an option would be made viable and achievable through winning over both Pakistan and India to favor this policy option so that threat of emergence of China and Islamic block may be addressed. For this purpose, Pak-India disputes would be resolved to keep, on the one hand, Pakistan away from China and Chinese dependence and, on the other hand, to encourage and enable Pakistan to fight Pakistani Taliban which are aligned with Afghan Taliban to establish Islamic state in Afghanistan.   

It was also stated in the same article that in case of failure of first choice, the second choice of USA may be to support Islamic state in Afghanistan, provided such an Islamic state is anti-China and anti-Iran. The basic objective behind such a policy option would be the same i.e. to undo the threat of emergence of Chinese-Muslim block. To achieve objectives behind this policy option, Taliban would be encouraged to enflame liberation movement in Chinese province of Xinxiang. In order to make such a policy a success, Pak-India disputes would be resolved so that Pakistan’s dependence over China may be reduced to the minimum and resultantly Pakistan may not resist Islamic state of Afghanistan’s anti-China role.

The recent developments in Afghanistan may be appreciated in the backdrop of the geo-strategic scenario delineated above.

The USA seems to have failed in achieving its first policy option in Afghanistan. As mentioned earlier, one objective behind the USA’s first policy option was to have a pro USA regime at Kabul. But the current peace talks between Afghan Taliban and Kabul regime is an effort to include Afghan Taliban in the government. Thanks to Afghan resistance, the future regime at Kabul has to be Islamic regime, not a USA’s puppet. The USA employed many tactics to win over Pakistan to its first policy option through creating bad blood between Pakistan and  Afghan Taliban. But Pakistan showed tremendous resilience to stand against USA’s pressure and did not turn against Afghan Taliban even in the face of series of bomb blasts carried out in Pakistan’s cities by the terrorists. As mentioned, another objective of the USA’s first policy option was to develop friendly diplomatic and economic relations between Pakistan and India. As both India and USA wanted to create Pak-India rapprochement by keeping Kashmir dispute at fence, Pakistan foiled USA’s attempt to get Pakistan to develop close economic and friendly diplomatic relations with India at the cost of Kashmir. As the basic objective behind the USA’s first policy option was to create hurdle in the way of Political and Economic Alliance likely to be emerged between China and regional Muslim countries, China also countered USA’s policy by ending its historical inward looking policy, and adopting an outward looking policy China played an important role in foiling the USA’s policy objective by engaging Afghan Taliban and facilitating peace process between Afghan Taliban and Kabul regime so that Afghanistan may be integrated into likely emerging regional Alliance.

Now that USA’s first policy option has been failed, USA may take on the second policy option.

As already mentioned, USA’s second policy option in Afghanistan aims at creating  bad blood between China and Afghan Taliban. When Afghan Taliban were under unity of command, it was a really hard target to win over Afghan Taliban to this second policy option; but death of Mulla Omar has eased the USA’s task. After Omar’s death, Afghan Taliban have lost their unity of command, and some Afghan groups may play in the USA’s hands which may employ such Afghan groups to support or undertake militant activities in Muslim territory of China. This scenario gets even more likelihood when we see that, in recent months, the central stage of war in Afghanistan has been shifted from the south to the north which is nearer to China border.

The USA was most likely knowing of the death of Mulla Omar, but USA kept this news in secrecy with the hope that Afghan Taliban, under pretended unity of command, might come in terms with USA and Kabul regime-an exigency which was vital for protecting USA’s regional interests; but when Afghan Taliban came into terms with China as well, the USA realized they were losing the game, and China was succeeding in bringing Afghanistan under its influence. It was the right time for USA to take on the second policy option. Because pretended Afghan unity of command had come into terms with China, it became necessary to divulge the news of Mulla Omar’s death so that Afghan Taliban might be split apart and some Afghan factions might be chosen by the USA to implement its second policy option.

There are many implications of USA’s second policy option for the region (continued).

Khilafah and Imamah- not contradictory concepts (2)

     

In the part (1) of this article, we have seen that most of the religious disagreements between Sunni and Shiite Schools of Thoughts are relating to ‘Different’ views; they are not relating to ‘Contradictory’ religious views. The conflicts relating to ‘Different’ views may be resolved by accepting right of each school of thoughts to have Different view based on Quran and Sunnah. As far as ‘Contradictory’ views and conflicts relating to them are concerned, they are a few and may be resolved by the intelligentsia belonging to both sides.

We have also seen in part (1) that concepts of khilafah and Imamah are two ‘Different’ concepts- not contradictory concepts- held by the Sunni and the Shiite; though mode of appointment of Imam and caliph is the main conflicting  aspect of the two concepts. The issue of appointment of Imam and caliph would be discussed in the succeeding lines, with a view to find out points of convergence between the two concepts.

It needs to be clarified from the outset that the concepts of appointment of caliph and Imam, described in the succeeding lines, are necessarily based on the historical facts, not necessarily based on religious views held by the Sunni and the Shiite. In other words, we will base our discussion on historical facts which may be or may not be reflected in the religious views held by the both groups- Sunni and Shiite. In my view, the historical facts approach is the best way to have access to the original tenors of the concept of appointment caliph and Imam.

 In view of Sunni Schools of Thought, a caliph is to be appointed by the people; whereas, in view of Shiite Schools of Thought, an Imam is to be appointed by Divinity. Similarly, in view of Shiite Schools of Thoughts, an Imam acts under Divine guidance and guides people under Divine guidance. Actually these both views- relating to Divine appointment and guidance of Imam- are inter-related and may be discussed as one issue.

Regarding Divine appointment of Imam, the first thing which needs to be understood is the way such Divine appointment may be made.

We have already seen in the article ‘Wahi, Intuition and their Implications’ that Allah communicates with His creatures through ‘wahi’; wahi is initiated by an angel. Al-shura-52 states “We made “wahi” to you  [Muhammad (saw)] an Angel with Our command”. From this verse, it appears that sending down an angel with Allah’s message is called ‘wahi’. It has also been seen in the same article that prophetic ‘wahi’ is always carried by Gabriel (a.s) whereas non-prophetic ‘wahi’ may be carried by an angel other than Gabriel (a.s). We have also seen in the same article that devils from jinn and human beings can also make ‘wahi’ to other humans. Therefore followers need to differentiate between Satanic wahi and Allah’s wahi.

Among the various forms of non-prophetic wahi are coming of an idea in the recipient’s mind; hearing an hidden voice; seeing visuals of  a past, present or future event-which cannot be seen by other people around; seeing something written which cannot be seen by other people around etc. All these non-prophetic forms of ‘wahi’ are developed/ carried through an angel. But all forms of non-prophetic wahi are open to be affected by devils which can affect such non-prophetic wahi with Satanic wahi generated by these devils.

We have also seen in the article ‘wahi, Intuition and their Implications’  that prophetic ‘wahi’ is to be compulsorily complied with by the followers; whereas non-prophetic ‘wahi’ is NOT to be compulsorily complied with by the followers. Non-prophetic ‘wahi’ is actually for personal guidance of the recipient, and may be complied with by the followers only if such non-prophetic ‘wahi’ is in line with the prevailing Shariah. This difference between applicability of prophetic and non-prophetic wahi is understandable due to the fact that recipients of non-prophetic wahi are not as much protected in their actions and sayings by Allah as recipients of prophetic wahi are. Therefore non-prophetic wahi can be complied with only if such ‘wahi’ is in line with prevailing Shariah which has been revealed to the personalities which are most protected in their actions and sayings by Allah as against recipients of non-prophetic ‘wahi’ which is exposed to be affected by ‘wahi’ from devils from jinn and human beings.

From the foregoing, we may draw a conclusion that an Imam may be recipient of non-prophetic wahi, and it is through non-prophetic wahi that Imam acts under Divine guidance. Every Shiite faction believes that our Nabi (s.a.w.w) is the last of ‘Nabis’; it implies that no Imam receives prophetic wahi- a prophetic wahi is a wahi which declares the recipient as a Nabi. If an Imam receives a non-prophetic wahi, it needs to be appreciated that non-prophetic wahi is for personal guidance of the recipient and it has to be in line with the Shariah i.e. Quran and Sunnah. It needs not to emphasize that Imam-ate is spiritual and worldly leadership; in other words, an Imam must have all  such knowledge which must prove his actions and sayings as in consonance with Quran and Sunnah; he must have such character and conduct which should earn him spiritual and worldly leadership. The non-prophetic wahi received by him helps him in acquiring the knowledge, character and conduct required to put him at the place of worldly and spiritual leadership. In other words, it is not that status of Imam-ate is conferred by Divinity on a person directly; rather more appropriately, it is the bundle of responsibilities which is conferred on a person by Divinity so that he may achieve the status of an Imam through acquiring spiritual and worldly knowledge and through developing required character and conduct. Imam-ate is not 'wahbi'; it is cultivable but it is cultivable  under Divine guidance. At a time, there may be more than one persons receiving Divine guidance which  helps  them in  acquiring required knowledge and qualities on basis of which any one of them would be acknowledged as Imam.

The history shows that the Shiite people have been acknowledging a person as an Imam who, in their view, was more suitable to be acknowledged as Imam in terms of social conduct, qualities and knowledge as against some other competitor. Thus we see that many Shiite people acknowledged Hazrat Zaid (a.s) as Imam as against Imam al-Baqir who is acknowledged as Imam by ‘Ithna Ashariyya’ faction (though both personalities are ahle bait’s descendants). Similarly many Shiite people acknowledged Imam Ismael as Imam as against Imam Musa Kazim who is acknowledged as Imam by ‘Ithna Ashariyyah’ faction (though both personalities are  ahle bait’s descendants).

In the light of the foregoing, we may find out some points of convergence in concepts of ‘Khilafah and Imamah’ with particular reference of appointment of Imam and ‘khaleefah’, and Divine guidance of Imam, and see how far these points converge or diverse.

The first point of convergence may be found in respect of non-prophetic wahi received by Imam. The non-prophetic wahi in the form of an idea coming in human mind; hearing an hidden voice; seeing visuals of  a past, present or future events-which cannot be seen by other people around; seeing something written which cannot be seen by other people around etc. is not an idea repugnant to Sunni Schools of Thoughts. All these forms of Divine guidance are acknowledged by Sunni Schools of Thoughts; though they may not be named as non-prophetic wahi. It is not important what name is given by Sunni Schools of Thoughts to these forms of non-prophetic wahi; it is enough if all these forms are considered as various forms of Divine guidance. All high statured ‘Aulia Allah’ are believed to be blessed with availing these forms of Divine guidance. Therefore the concept of Divine guidance nourished by Shiite regarding an Imam, and by Sunni regarding  ‘Aulia-Allah’ is the same.

The second point of convergence is that such Divine guidance is to be acknowledged subject to the Shariah i.e. Quran and Sunnah.  As both Sunni and Shiite believe that Divine guidance should be in consonance with Quran and Sunnah, we may conclude that both Sunni and Shiite are in agreement regarding the concept of Divine guidance.

The most crucial point is the third one- whether or not an interpretation of Shariah adopted by an Imam may be questioned and declared as repugnant to or deviated from the Shariah. In this regard, it may be appreciated that an Imam is supposed to be a worldly and spiritual leader. Blessed with Divine guidance, he is supposed to be able to justify all his actions and sayings in the light of Shariah; if he is a person who cannot present such justifications for his actions and sayings, he would definitely not be acknowledged as Imam by the majority of Muslim people. If we see through the history, we find that all persons (who were descendants of ahle bait) and who were considered as Imams by the Shiite community were highly regarded by all Sunni Muslims as well due to their piety, knowledge and strength of character.  All Muslims- Shiite and Sunni- considered that all these personalities were capable of justifying their deeds in the light of Shariah; though the Sunni do not believe that views held by Shiite are the views held by the concerned Imams. Briefly speaking, an Imam of Muslims would be only a person of such a piety and knowledge that would convince the people of rightness of his deeds. In other words, an Imam would be a person who would be able to justify his interpretations of shariah in the light of Shariah. In other words, this point pertains to the time when Imam would be among the people- at that time it would be seen whether a person claimed to be an Imam is able to justify his deeds in the light of shariah or not; it is premature to make this point a point of conflict in the present age. However, in Sunni's view, people may differ with the caliph's view point in the light of shariah.

The fourth point is that an Imam would be only a descendant of ahle bait. I believe that if a person is blessed with Divine guidance; if he is able to justify his deeds in the light of shariah; if he is able to command Muslims’ loyalty and faith in his piety and knowledge, Sunni Muslims would not hesitate in acknowledging his ‘Imamah’ and ‘khilafah’, even if Shiite would believe that such person is the only eligible person for Imamah, being a descendant of ahle bait. Similarly, if no descendant of ahle bait  is capable of developing all these qualities mentioned above, Muslims would not acknowledge any descendant of ahle bait  as Imam or ‘Khaleefah’, notwithstanding what faith the Shiite community have. This point also pertains to the time when claimant of Imam would be among the people; it is again pre-mature to make this point a point of conflict in the present age. 
We may conclude that 'Imamah' and 'Khilafah' are Different but not Contradictory concepts; therefore Shiite and Sunni may live with both these concepts simultaneously.